The Islamic Debate over Democracy: Jihadi-Salafi Responses to Hamas' Victory in the Palestinian  Elections



Introduction
Hamas' surprising victory in the recent Palestinian parliamentary elections-the first  democratic elections to date-have raised a number of questions, not least due to the  steep rate of the movement's success and its sheer unstoppable rise to power. These  questions relate to Hamas' future policy, the next developments in the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict, and the very existence of the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, it seems that Hamas itself is unprepared to handle such an overwhelming victory, and there are signs  that the need to compose the Palestinian government by itself with no significant partners  puts the movement before significant challenges.

Hamas' success of in free elections should be viewed as a landmark event taking place  within the context of the highly-developed Palestinian public opinion, pluralism, and  sense of democracy-a political culture quite unique in the Arab region. The elections  were also regarded as another step in the U.S. campaign for the promotion of democracy  in the Middle East, in line with the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, the parliamentary elections in Iraq, and the U.S. pressures towards the parliamentary elections in Egypt. The democratic process in the Arab world began in 1992 with the first free elections in  Algeria, in which the Islamic front of FIS won the majority. This was followed by  elections in Jordan, where the Islamic Action Front of the Muslim Brotherhood seized  over one third of the seats. The Egyptian elections in December 2005, meanwhile,  strengthened the power of the Muslim Brotherhood there, despite the substantial efforts  by the authorities to limit the Brotherhood's potential power by means of massive waves  of arrests and policies of intimidation. The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood-the Islamic  Party-supported the elections in Iraq, despite the controversy over them in the Sunni  community, and the many attacks against its members and its platform by the various  Jihadi insurgent groups. In the past fifteen years it has become almost an axiom to say that free democratic  elections in the Arab world give rises to the Islamic elements vis-à-vis the nationalist  ones. One of the primary reasons for that is the ideological vacuum in the Arab world,  where Islamism, especially that extolled by the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, is the  only ideology left. In addition, Arab governments and publics find themselves in a crisis  as illustrated by a sense of social injustice perpetuated by the ruling classes, as well as  almost apocalyptic sense in the course of which the old Brotherhood's slogan-Islam is  the ultimate solution (al-Islam hua al-Hall)-has infiltrated large segments of Arab  societies. Thus far, the Palestinian elections seem to close the circle of a process that  started in Algeria, in which Islamic movements defeated liberation movements through democratic means, as illustrated by the AlgerianFLN and the Palestinian PLO/Fatah.

Al-Qaeda and Hamas

The democratic elections in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority, the semi-democratic  elections in Egypt, and especially the role of the United States on one hand and of the  Brotherhood on the other, have also generated controversy and an ambivalence over the  attitude towards "Western" democracy among Jihadi-Salafi circles too. Moreover, Al- Qaeda, global Jihad, or Jihadi Salafiyyah, pose a threat not only to the West or to local governments, but also to mainstream Arab Islamic movements belonging to the school of  the Brotherhood. In the case of Iraq, Jihadis seem, as of now to have a consensus against  the participation in the democratic processes, no matter what form this process may take  on. That said, the success of Hamas-a Jihadi movement, even if focused locally and  only against Israel-has posted some question marks. These question marks are not new but rather a product of ongoing ambivalence towards  Hamas in the past three to four years.1 On one hand, Hamas has conducted most of the  terrorist activity against "the Jewish State" while adhering to Jihadi tenets. It also served  as a model of Jihadi sacrifice in the form of the suicide bombings and its martyrs  (Shuhada). On the other hand, however, Hamas has been viewed as part of Palestinian nationalism, conducting a "Jihad for the Homeland" instead of a "Jihad for Allah." For  many supporters of global Jihad, Hamas is also an obstacle in the way of infiltration of  Al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Authority. It is a movement that cooperates with Shi`i Iran  and Hizballah; that defended Yaser Arafat until his death in November 2004; and that,  more recently has shown signs of regression in its policy by accepting and keeping its  promise of a period of truce with Israel. Hamas is also an integral part of the Muslim Brotherhood, a harsh rival in the eyes of Jihadi-Salafists, with a political and social  doctrine that we might call "evolution, not revolution." The Brotherhood also has a  strong tendency to support, at least tactically, democratic processes in the Arab world in  which its prospects to win look promising.

Jihadi-Salafiyyah and Democracy

Islam's interaction with democracy is of key importance for Jihadi-Salafi groups since  opposing democracy in the Western form in general, and rejecting man-made laws in  favor of the principle of Divine Law in particular, is perceived as a sacred doctrine.  Power derived from human beings rather than from Allah is an obvious heresy-Kufr. In  recent years, the question of the legitimacy of elections became more controversial as more and more Muslims living in the West too questioned the religious legitimacy of  participating in Western elections. Books on this topic, especially those opposing  participation of Muslims in democratic processes, are now translated by Salafi scholars  and groups into English.2 Given the American campaign to bring democracy to the Arab  world, Jihadi-Salafi groups view democracy not only as a heresy, but also as an integral  part of the new "Crusader" campaign of colonialism-al-Hamlah al-Salibiyyah al- Jadidah-and the historical conspiracy against the Muslim world. This worldview is  supported by more moderate Islamic elements in the Arab world, especially Saudi and  Egyptian mainstream clerics and scholars, and has also been controversial also around the  recent Iraqi elections. We should also bear in mind that democracy is also a threatening prospect for most Arab  governments, be they kingdoms or republics. Conservative nationalist scholars perceive  democracy in terms of "Western political-cultural imperialism," a heritage of past periods  where the Soviet Union and Arab socialism have been influential in the region. Furthermore, in many Arab countries, where Islamic movements are leading the opposition and hence, are oppressed, they are also the leading advocates for civil rights,  starting from the Algerian FIS to the Saudi Islamic reform movement. There are several famous Jihadi-Salafi edicts-fatwas-have been issued against  democracy and parliamentary elections. Supporters of global Jihad have made intensive  use of these fatwas in order to criticize the Palestinian elections in general and Hamas'  participation in particular. On 18 January 2006, the webmaster of Al-Maqrizi Center in  London, which is headed by the Egyptian Islamist Dr. Hani al-Siba`i, posted on the Jihadi forum Al-Hesbah a list of names of 102 Islamic clerics, some of whom are already dead.  All of them severely opposed any participation in parliamentary elections in the Muslim  world.3 The list was meant to influence the Palestinian Hamas not to take part in the  elections. The list featured the names of 52 Egyptians, 22 Saudis, 5 Jordanians (among  them "Sheikh" Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi), 5 Syrians, 4 Moroccans, two Sudanese, two Lebanese, two Kuwaitis, as well as one Iraqi, Nigerian, Mauritanian, and Yemeni each.  The dominant share of Egyptians and Saudis reflects their significant role in the  development of Jihadi Salafiyyah, as a result of the integration between Egyptian exiles  from the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi scholars there. Four were Palestinians, with no links to Hamas or the Brotherhood, among them two  interesting individuals-Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani and Abd al-Qadim Zaloum, the  founders and first two leaders of the Islamic Liberation Party (Tahrir Party). Another past  Tahriri leader-Ahmad al-Da`our-is listed among the Jordanian clerics. This is  interesting because in the debate over the elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian  Authority, supporters of Jihadi-Salafiyyah for the first time bestowed a sense of  legitimacy on the Tahrir Party and its positions against democracy and elections. In  recent weeks, the Tahrir Party has published and distributed several pamphlets in the  Palestinian Authority and on its web sites, calling for the boycott of the Palestinian  elections, as well as those in Iraq. Several prominent members of the party took part in  the debates in Jihadi forums and were welcomed for their stance regarding elections. Several supporters of Jihadi-Salafiyyah even relied upon material written by the Tahrir  Party, including Fatwas, and circulated on its forums.

The Tahrir Party has been traditionally ambivalent in its opposition to the elections, but  developed more assertive opposition that has strengthened in light of events in Iraq and  Central Asia. Despite the wide ideological gaps between the Tahrir and Jihadi-Salafist  groups, as well as the severe attacks against it by the later against the former on many  grounds, the issue of democracy and elections might provide be a basis for closer relations in the future. Even though the party is still regarding itself as being in the  theoretical phase (nazari) and not in the practical one `amali) yet, the dynamics of global  Jihad brings Tahrir's younger generation. The most popular Jihadi rulings for Jihadi-Salafist opponents of democratic elections are  those written by the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the spiritual  father of Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad; Abu Basir al-Tartusi, the Syrian in exile in London; and  the old-time ideologue of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad-Abd al-Qader bin Abd al-Aziz.4  These writing were used by Jihadi sympathizers against Hamas relatively often prior to the elections. The best example for the criticism of the Jihadi Salafiyyah over Hamas can be found in  an article in the form of an interview with Abu Jandal al-Azdi, a Saudi cleric and one of  the first leaders of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, who is imprisoned by the authorities since  2003.5 His main criticism over Hamas concentrated on its support for Arafat and the  Palestinian national struggle. Arafat, according to Al-Azdi was a Murtadd-the worst  form of apostasy-whose fate should have been by killing him, and "a greater enemy than the Jews." Hamas' support for Arafat was unforgivable to Al-Azdi, since it turned  the movement into infidels too. Hamas also supported Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen, the  "known Baha'i," and held open discussions with the Egyptian intelligence services. Al-Azdi's main criticism, however, used widely by supporters of global Jihad in the  period before the Palestinian elections, was that of Hamas' distinction between the external and internal enemies-a distinction adopted from the doctrines of the Muslim  Brotherhood. Al-Azdi cited Abu Qutada who wrote, "the Jihad of the Muslim  Brotherhood has only one meaning and narrow-minded understanding-the Jihad against  the foreigners. The Egyptians should fight the British, the Palestinians against the Jews,  and the Afghans against the Russians. They have never thought about fighting the Arab  enemies, since they lack the legal basis for such a struggle, which is understanding the  Tawhid according to the understanding of the Salaf-the companions of the Prophet." Abu Jandal al-Azdi disqualified also rejected any possibility of a temporary Truce- Hudnah-with the Jews or Israel, unless it includes the strict conditions of Salafism. Yet,  he concluded his article by leaving an interesting opening for Hamas, by focusing on the  principle that "the benefit of the peace-Sulh-for the interest of the Muslim public  might be greater than the war. In such a case you are even allowed to prolong the truce  for more than ten years." The traditional Islamic principle of the benefit of the  community works even in the case of the Jihadi-Salafists, and could always serve as a  basis for pragmatism.
 

Responses to Hamas' Electoral victory

Hamas' victory in the recent elections created a vigorous debate in Jihadi forums, which  was somehow lost some of its enthusiasm as a result of the "virtual Jihad" currently  conducted against Denmark. The stunning victory of Hamas heightened the ambivalence  of the responses by Salafists. Early public statements by Hamas leaders, as well as Israeli,  American, and European reactions, however, helped generate criticism over Hamas. In particular, members of these forums expressed fear that the movement might change  policies in favor of entering the political process with Israel. The opening tone of the critics was provided by the Kuwaiti Jihadi-Salafi cleric Hamed  al-Ali, a very popular figure among the younger generation of supporters of global Jihad.  In an article in the Jihadi forum Al-Hesbah dated 27 January 2006, titled "Hamas'  dilemma," Al-Ali attacked Hamas, even though he could not refrain from blessing them  for their achievement.6 According to Al-Ali, Palestine is the focus of the Jihadi struggle  and the most complicated place of the Muslim nation, "a microcosm of the entire Ummah." Yet, "Palestine is not the property of the Palestinians, hence, they cannot  decide by themselves what way to chose."

Even though Hamas deserves applause for its victory and for gaining the trust of the Palestinian public, "it is badly in need of the  advice and guidance of the Islamic nation." In other words, Hamas won a trust that  belongs to the entire Islamic nation, and therefore should consult the rest of the Islamists  for its future decisions.

Hamas should choose the only strategic path of the Islamists -  resistance. According to Al-Ali, by winning the elections and turning into the Palestinian Authority  Hamas finds itself in a dilemma between two choices only: either falling under a  strangling siege, or following the fate of Fatah towards a compromise with the Jews.  Hamas, Al-Ali said, is facing now three contradicting situation: The contradiction between its Islamic ideology and a political situation that  rejects this ideology. Every Islamic movement that joins the "path of democracy" falls into this dilemma and trap.  . The contradiction between Hamas' solid and uncompromising positions  regarding any concessions in Palestine so far, and the need to soften them now  that they are the ruling element.  . The need to preserve the noble values of its martyrs while preserving its rule.  Hamas is now like a "sheep besieged by wild animals that want to suck her  blood." To sum up, Al-Ali criticized Hamas for its decision to participate in a process that put the  movement in an almost impossible situation. At the same time, he urges the other  Islamists to assist Hamas and guide it in the right path, instead of condemning it or  ignoring their serious dilemma. His "softened" words, are akin to a sort of patronage as if  Hamas should always bear in mind that its recent victory is not only its own, but that it  needs to share it with the rest of the Muslim world in order to refrain from future  mistakes. Some of the responses to this article were not written in a "soft" tone. The stricter Salafis  are unable to forgive Hamas for disobeying Allah's rules by participating in the elections.  Others, however, focused on Hamas' social work in favor of the Palestinian public and its  difficulties in fighting simultaneously on all the fronts. Some even call for changing the Islamic project in Palestine into several stages. Focusing on the welfare of the Palestinian  public is therefore a noble phase on its own right, and Hamas is the only Palestinian  movement capable of providing for the Palestinian people. One interesting criticism came from some supporters of global Jihad who claimed that  the Palestinians should view themselves as part of the entire oppressed Islamic nation and  should not isolate their case as Hamas seems
to do.

Conclusion

In general, most Jihadi-Salafi responses to the Hamas' victory were critical since Hamas  entered a process that is contradictory to the Jihadi-Salafi worldview regarding  democracy and elections, and the principles of the loyalty to Allah and refutation of its  enemies (Al-Walaa' wal-Baraa'), in addition to the pragmatic nature of the Muslim  Brotherhood. We can assume that Hamas leaders are ignoring the Jihadi-Salafi voices or critics. There  is, however, a slow but growing sense of apocalypse pervading many young  Palestinians-a sense that is connected to the insurgency in Iraq, the global Jihad, and a  sense of nihilism, which may increase in the face of Hamas' historic victory in the  elections. The first Jihadi-Salafi Palestinian web site and forum has recently been opened-AlOmmh.net-which promotes the infiltration of Jihadi-Salafi ideas into the  Palestinian public, and encourages the communication between Palestinian and other  Islamists. Hamas' winning of the Palestinian elections is a turning point in various aspects. The  Jihadi-Salafis would certainly try to push Hamas into more hard-line positions, through a  slow infiltration into the Palestinian public. In case Hamas would gradually change its  policy towards Israel and even abandon terrorism for a long temporary period, the global  Jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda or affiliated elements may try to take the "torch of Jihad"  and establish affiliated groups in the Palestinian territories.

We should bear in mind that  the new situation in the Palestinian Authority could dismantle the Fatah, institute much  change in the Palestinian security forces, and create new political, military, or family  alliances, not to mention an interim period of chaos, more unemployment and financial difficulties, and an altogether unstable situation. Such conditions may be a golden  opportunity for the Jihadi-Salafiyyah to find supporting elements among the Palestinians  in the Palestinian Authority, as they slowly but surely currently do in some of the  Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. We may also assume that the issues of democracy and participation in elections will  remain a controversial element in the Islamist discourse. Hamas' victory, however, may  add to the controversy and even shake the Jihadi-Salafi persistent opposition. If Hamas  succeeds, even partly, in directing the Palestinian Authority and people towards better  conditions, it may serve for many Islamists as a model of successful Islamic Sunni rule. The "benefit and interest" of the Muslim public may play here a pragmatic role for  change of policy, if not in the eyes of hard-line Jihadi groups, at least in the eyes of Arab  publics. In some way, Hamas' victory might be a turning point that will affect larger segments of  Arab societies in the region, especially those that are influenced by the Muslim  Brotherhood.

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1 On the issue of Hamas and Al-Qaeda see also: Reuven Paz, "Hamas vs. Al-Qaeda: The Condemnation of  the Khobar Attack," PRISM Special Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 4 (June 2004). See on-line in: http://www.e- prism.org/images/PRISM_Special_dispatch_no_3-2.pdf

2 See for example: TheDoubts Regarding the Ruling of Democracy in Islam, A collection of Salafi positions  and rulings, published by Al-Tibyan Publications, London, 2nd edition, June 2004, No author.

3 See the list on-line in: http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=48196

4 For the best list of Jihadi-Salafi writings on democracy and elections, see in the section on "democracy"  in Al-Maqdisi's web site-Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad-- http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=91 Abu Omar Seif, a Jordanian cleric who was the main cleric of the Arab volunteers in Chechnya, and was  killed there in November 2005, wrote the most recent book on the issue. See his book-Al-Nizam al- Dimuqrati nizam Kufr-regarding Iraq, in: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3639

5 See on-line in: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=1508&c=1573

6 Hamed al-Ali, Ma'zaq Hamas (Hamas' Dilemma), 27 January 2006. See on-line in: http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=49903

  7 Risalat al-Ummah al-Jihadiyyah -- www.alommh.net/forums/